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Oil-abundant countries, Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries try to im-
prove democratic institutions and to manage their chronically big governments, while experiencing 
decreased world oil prices. These countries pursue open door policies. Most of the foreign revenues 
of the region stem from oil and gas exports. Thus, how to manage the production and exports of fos-
sil resources is of great importance. This study aims to analyse the effects of quality of democracy, 
government size, and the degree of openness in explaining depletion of reserves between 1985 and 
2015. After testing for panel unit root and co-integration, a panel data model was estimated consid-
ering random effects. The results indicate that democratisation and political stability causes higher 
depletion of oil. In addition, government size affects depletion in a non-linear form, so that oil 
production is maximised, when government expenditure accounts for nearly 14% of GDP, on aver-
age. Furthermore, trade openness positively impacts on the oil depletion. In this case study, higher 
oil depletion follows strengthening democratic foundations, resizing the public sector, expanding 
politico-economic ties with trade partners, and applying the modern technology in the upstream oil 
industries.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In resource-rich countries, governments finance public expenditure through 
natural resources exports. Thus, the aggregate tax-to-GDP ratios are generally 
low. For instance, the average tax/GDP ratio was 7.4% for the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 2015, whereas OECD countries ex-
perience an average of 34.8% (Heritage Foundation 2015). Generally, the politi-
cal regimes which benefit from public participation in socioeconomic decisions, 
liberal elections, free media, plural parties and non-governmental organisations 
have high tax/GDP ratios, because people usually demand education, health and 
social welfare. As a result, governments are accountable for public demands. 
Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries1 are oil-depend-
ent countries of the politically unstable Middle East. The historical experiences 
in this region indicate the heavy reliance on exports of crude oil and natural gas 
from early 1950s until now (Fasano-Iqbal 2003). Although the selling of natural 
resources is regarded as the easiest income source for oil-rich governments, it re-
sults in unsustainable development from an intergenerational justice viewpoint.
The higher oil prices over the 1970s, on the one hand, and financing develop-
ment projects in both military and civil sectors, on the other hand, stimulated the 
increasing extraction from oil and gas fields. These developments have led to oil 
depletion – the gradual exhaustion of oil reserves.
The common feature of the political systems in the region is the lack of demo-
cratic institutions (Ottaway – Carothers 2004). Almost all of the oil-rich countries 
of the Middle-East have experienced monarchy, kingdom, or sultanate regimes in 
the pre- and post-exploration periods of oil fields. 
Since oil-based countries are highly dependent on exporting crude oil and its 
products, foreign earnings play an influential role in stabilizing exchange rate 
market, lowering inflation rate, creating jobs and intervening government in so-
cial and political affairs (Jensen – Wantchekon 2004; Schwarz 2008). In par-
ticular, economic booms often occur when oil prices are increasing in the world 
markets. In such conditions, any administrative inefficiency can be compensated 
by injection of export earnings to the domestic economy and adoption of mon-
etary and fiscal expansionary policies. These policies are consistent with higher 
military budget, which in turn lowers civil society capability. 
Speaking of the developing oil-rich economies, this paper aims to answer these 
questions: How democracy affects oil production and depletion? What are the ef-
fects of government size and trade openness on oil production? 
1  Its member states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates .
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The rest of the paper is outlined in 4 sections. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 is devoted to the materials and methods applied in the paper and to the 
analysis of results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The numerous studies have centered on the exploitation of natural resources. 
Rent-seeking, resource curse, Dutch disease and Environmental Kuznets curve 
(EKC) are common terms in examining natural resource economics. Mismanage-
ment of natural resources stems from greed of governmental authorities in ex-
tracting and selling natural stocks, lack of non-governmental and environmental 
organisations and absence of strong rival parties for the ruling party.
As Brooks – Kurtz (2013) point out, the rents accruing from natural resource 
exports cause authoritarianism, since governments in natural resource-rich na-
tions can easily afford to be myopic, and they trade off long-term growth for im-
mediate consumption and power. 
In a game-theoretic model, Bhattacharyya – Hodler (2010) predict that natural 
resources lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institu-
tions is relatively poor. They test this theoretical prediction using panel data of 99 
countries during 1980–2004 and confirm that the relationship between resource 
abundance and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions.
If there are no serious competitors for the ruling party in parliament and the 
political arena, the exploitation and exhaustion of natural resources can be accel-
erated. On the contrary, the presence of strong parties with a significant number 
of parliamentary seats reduces the possibility of misusing natural resources. Prze-
worski – Limongi (1993) suggest that democracies can be beneficial for growth 
because democratic institutions constrain “predatory” tendencies of the ruling 
class, which might harm investment and growth.
The weak economic growth of resource-based economies is known as “re-
source curse” which has been verified in various studies, for example Sachs 
– Warner (2001), Gylfason (2001), Atkinson – Hamilton (2003) and Mehlum et 
al. (2006). Sachs – Warner (2001) argue that resource abundance tends to render 
the export sectors uncompetitive; and resource-abundant countries never suc-
cessfully pursue broad-based export-led growth. Using historical datasets and 
employing time-series centric techniques, Haber – Menaldo (2011) test to see 
if there is a long-run relationship between resource reliance and regime type 
within countries over time. They found that increases in resource reliance are 
not associated with authoritarianism. In fact, they generate results that suggest 
a resource blessing.
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Morrison (2009) argues that non-tax revenue is neither pro-democratic nor 
antidemocratic by its nature; rather, such income merely stabilises the extant re-
gime. From the point of view of Auty – Gelb (2000), high rents in the resource 
sector corrode incentives to invest in the non-resource economy and undermine 
industrialisation by means of the Dutch disease of exchange rate appreciation. 
The continued extraction of exhaustible resources reduces the remaining life 
of reserves. This may leave low stocks for the future generations, which in turn 
leads to unsustainable and unfair development. To meet intergenerational equity, 
Hartwick (1977) recommends investing all profits or rents from exhaustible re-
sources in reproducible capital, when he designs a model to solve the ethical 
problem of the current generation shortchanging future generations by “over-
consuming” the current product. In addition, the overexploitation of renewable 
resources such as overextraction of forests and overfishing could endanger bio-
diversity by reducing the fauna and flora stocks. Swanson (1994) and Hilborn 
et al. (1995) have shown that if natural ecosystems confront with overuse and 
excessive human activities, the degradation and depletion of the environmental 
capital will be inevitable. 
In an investigation of the effect of natural resource rents on the economic 
performance of democracy, Collier – Hoeffler (2009) found that, in the absence 
of resource rents, democracies significantly outperform autocracies, whereas if 
rents are large relative to GDP, autocracies outperform democracies. The critical 
point at which the two have equivalent effects is when resource rents are around 
8% of GDP.
The governments of resource-rich countries tend to be less accountable to their 
citizens. Collier (2010) believes that the provocation of rebellions is an extreme 
consequence of lack of accountability.
In an analysis of the rents from natural resources, Auty (2007) finds that over-
rapid domestic absorption is inflationary, and risks of Dutch disease weaken the 
future growth potential of the economy. He adds “rapid absorption will exacer-
bate the Dutch disease effects and increase the dependence of the poor on finite 
rent transfers that are not sustainable” (Auty 2007: 631–633). 
The joint aspect of empirical studies on natural resources’ abundance is the 
negative effect of resource rents on the democratic processes, in such a way, that 
rent-seeking governments are less accountable and more corrupt. Hence, achiev-
ing a long-run and sustainable path for socioeconomic growth and development 
requires identifying the factors influencing natural resource management. Fo-
cusing on oil production, this paper tries to find these factors across the oil-rich 
countries of Middle-East geopolitical region.
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3. MATERIALS AND METHODS
3.1. Data and variables
This research focuses on democracy trend, government size and trade openness 
as predictors of oil production. The statistical sample consists of the selected 
oil-producing countries in the Middle East region including Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Qatar , Saudi Arabia, Oman and United Arab Emirates2. Because of the availabil-
ity of data, the period of study was confined to 1985–2015. Most of our data were 
extracted from World Bank, BP Statistical Review of World Energy and Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IFS). 
The dependent variable is oil production (Q). It is influenced by world oil 
price, oil reserves, climatic and political variables.  
Figure 1 illustrates mean oil production for our sample along with world oil 
price over time. The overall trend in Q matches historical changes in crude oil 
price, so that a strong positive correlation is derived between logarithms of Q and 
world oil price by +0.71.
The democracy level is the only variable extracted from Polity IV dataset 
(Center for Systematic Peace 2015). This dataset covers all independent states 
with a total population of 500,000 or more. The Polity project examines the quali-
ties of democracy in governing institutions. It describes a range of governing 
2 Bahrain was excluded from the sample because of its negligible oil production.
Figure 1. World oil price (US$/barrel) and mean oil production (thousands barrel/day) in logarithms
Source: World Bank and BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2016).
106 LOTFALI AGHELI
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
authority from fully institutionalised autocracies to mixed authority regimes to 
fully institutionalised democracies. The “Polity score” evaluates regime author-
ity on a scale ranging from –10 to +10. Then, the Polity scores are converted into 
three political categories: “autocracies” (–10 to –6), “anocracies” (–5 to +5) and 
“democracies” (+6 to +10) (Center for Systemic Peace 2014). 
The quality of democracy is depicted in Figure 2. It shows that democracy 
quality is very poor according to the Polity score. It varies between –9 and –6. In 
other words, the selected countries tend to be autocratic and this is not surprising 
with monarchy systems in 5 out of 7 countries under consideration. However, 
there is an overall orientation towards improvement in democratic quality in the 
region. 
The coefficient of correlation between averages of Q and quality of democ-
racy is +0.83, which indicates more democratic systems result in increasing oil 
production. 
In order to consider all potential factors in the economy which can affect oil 
production, two variables were added: government size, which shows the extent 
of public intervention in the national economy; and openness ratio, which indi-
cates international economic and political ties.
3.2. Model
The following functional form was specified to explain the movements in oil 
production, Q:
Figure 2. Quality of democracy in the selected oil-rich countries (mean polity score)
Source: Polity IV dataset, Center for Systematic Peace, 2014.
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  (1)
where POLIT denotes quality of democracy in terms of Polity score. GS shows 
the government size, as government expenditure to GDP ratio, and GS2 denotes 
the squared GS. OPEN measures the degree of openness defined by the ratio of 
total trade (sum of exports and imports) to GDP. 
The reason to include the government size in the squared form is that oil pro-
duction increases with increasing government size, but the unlimited increase 
in government size is impossible. On the one hand, government expenditure is 
determined through budget bill. On the other hand, oil production is subject to 
technical and geological constraints. For instance, among small oil producing 
countries such as Bahrain, the continued increase in oil production is not feasible 
due to geological conditions. Therefore, an optimal size for government can be 
found in such a way that oil production is maximised. In other words, the explicit 
relation between government size and oil production may take a non-linear form. 
Thus, the following panel data model is written:
  (2)
where subscripts i and t denote cross-sections (countries) and time horizon 
(years), respectively.
This model is defined in semi-logarithmic form, because the oil production fig-
ures are of million, or billion orders, but POLIT, GS and OPEN are expressed in 
relative or ordinal forms. Such specification guarantees the comparability among 
left- and right-hand side variables. 
Except for the sign of coefficient of GS2, I expect that partial derivatives of 
dependent variable to POLIT, GS and OPEN are to be positive. In other words, 
better quality of democracy encourages the oil production. Moreover, any increase 
in government size and trade openness results in increase in the oil production. Ac-
cording to the theoretical basics, one would expect the following partial derivatives:
  (3)
3.3. Results of econometric model estimation
Prior to estimating the model, all variables should be tested against unit root. Oth-
erwise, the spurious regression problem will occur. In the panel data models, the 
unit root tests are known as panel unit root tests, which are performed by various 
methods proposed by Im et al. (1997), Breitung (2000), and Levin et al. (2002). 
2 ( , , , ),     Q f POLIT GS GS OPEN
2
0   ,  it it it it it it it it it itLnQ POLIT GS GS OPENα α β γ θ ε     
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,    0,  0 ,  0 .    Ln Q Ln Q Ln Q Ln Q
POLIT GS GS OPEN
         
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In these cases, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1984) and Phillips-Perron (1988) 
tests are applicable. Table 1 reports the panel unit root tests, which indicate the 
existence of unit roots in the levels of variables, except for Log(Q), but all of 
them become stationary by the first-order differencing.
Due to panel unit roots, the other problem is to examine the existence of a 
long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables under study. Since all ex-
planatory variables are integrated of order one; I(1), the panel co-integration is 
tested using Kao residual co-integration test (Kao 1999). The null hypothesis 
indicates no co-integration. Here, Pedroni (1999) test is not applicable because 
of near singular matrix created by regression coefficients. The ADF t-statistic is 
–2.581, while the probability value is 0.0049. Thus, all variables are co-integrated 
in the long-run.
The third step is to choose between panel and pool system. This comparison is 
made through F-statistic, which is based on the null hypothesis indicating redun-
dant fixed effects. If null hypothesis is rejected, then the alternative hypothesis 
will be accepted in favour of panel system. Table 2 confirms the panel specifica-
tion by considering both cross-section and period fixed effects. 
Table 1. Panel unit root tests (1985–2015)
Variables Levin, Lin 
and Chu t-test
Breitung t-test Im-Pesaran- 
Shin W-test
ADF-Fisher 
Chi-square
PP- Fisher 
Chi-square
Ln(Q) –3.026***
(0.001)
–0.226
(0.411)
–3.245***
(0.000)
38.940***
(0.000)
28.506**
(0.012)
POLIT 0.752
(0.774)
0.862
(0.806)
1.163
(0.877)
4.185
(0.840)
3.472
(0.901)
∆POLIT –6.375***
(0.000)
2.136
(0.984)
–3.709***
(0.000)
39.877***
(0.000)
57.155***
(0.000)
GS –0.058
(0.477)
–0.670
(0.251)
0.026
(0.511)
11.913
(0.613)
10.006
(0.762)
∆GS –11.624***
(0.000)
–10.565***
(0.000)
–12.416***
(0.000)
128.389***
(0.000)
259.992***
(0.000)
GS2 0.958
(0.831)
–1.694
(0.045)
0.246
(0.597)
13.638
(0.477)
13.044
(0.523)
∆GS2 –12.920***
(0.000) 
–7.639***
(0.000)
–12.563***
(0.000)
131.967***
(0.000)
201.803***
(0.000)
OPEN 0.231
(0.591)
–1.358
(0.087)
–0.958
(0.169)
20.682
(0.110)
17.596
(0.226)
∆OPEN –9.869***
(0.000)
–6.976***
(0.000)
–9.938***
(0.000)
102.118***
(0.000)
425.219***
(0.000)
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote probability values. ***, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% 
and 5% level, respectively. 
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The fourth step is to choose between models with fixed or random effects. This 
is performed by Hausman test assuming random effects as null hypothesis. The 
random effects are preferred reasonably in the following cases:
1. The random intercept term of each cross-section unit is correlated with ex-
planatory variables.
2. The “time-invariant” variables, such as gender, religion, geographical re-
gion, and language are included in the model (Gujarati 2015). 
Table 3 reports the results of Hausman test. This indicates no rejection of ran-
dom effects. 
Table 3. Results of Hausman test 
Test summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Cross-section random 0.524 4 0.971
The final step is to estimate Model (2) within a random effects framework. Ac-
cording to the settings of cross-section random effects, Eviews software applies 
the pooled Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) to estimate the model. 
The signs of all coefficients are consistent with theoretical expectations. There 
are significant relations among variables under consideration. The model is es-
timated in the form of panel co-integration, which was confirmed in the former 
section. F-statistic indicates whole significance of the model and estimated ρ̑ 3 
indicates weak idiosyncratic random effects. These components explain about 
4% of total variance, whereas cross-section components (ρ̑ 1) account for nearly 
96% of total variance. 
According to the results, one unit increase in quality of democracy (polity 
score) increases the oil production by 0.043%3, other things being equal. This 
result is consistent with Bjorvatn et al. (2012) findings. Using panel data of 30 
3  Since dependent variable is expressed in logarithm, its change is interpretable as percentage 
figures. 
Table 2. Redundant fixed effects tests
Effects test Statistic  d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 292.248 (6,176) 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 519.613 6 0.000
Period F 1.857 (30,176) 0.007
Period Chi-square 59.686 30 0.001
Cross-Section/Period F 52.105 (36,176) 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 532.946 36 0.000
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oil-rich countries, they found that the political power balance moderates the in-
come effect of resource rents. Evidently, the balance of political power occurs in 
democratic and stable countries. The finding is promising in the context of man-
agement of oil production in the oil-rich areas. It is expected that in a shift toward 
democratised societies, the government authorities on the one hand and private 
sector and environmental activists on the other undertake more responsibility in 
extracting exhaustible resources and hindering depletion of oil and gas reserves.
The government size affects oil production in non-linear form. In oil-rich 
countries, governments extract and sell crude oil and gas to finance public ex-
penses. The ruling governments in all GCC members, Iran and Iraq have ex-
clusive property rights on natural resources, in particular, on energy-producing 
resources. So, when physical and institutional factors such as proved reserves, 
sanctions, production quota, let them extract resources, a continued flow of re-
sources’ rents is created, which finally reduces the government’s dependence on 
tax and other sustainable incomes. If the institutional environment is weak, and 
quality of governance is low, the extraction rates will increase. Because of spe-
cific politico-economic situation of the countries under consideration, this article 
takes unidirectional causality from government size to a given natural resource, 
i.e., crude oil. But, some authors, for instance, Atkinson – Hamilton (2003) con-
sider natural resources, with or without institutional quality effect, as influential 
factors on public expenditure.
The coefficients of GS and GS2 indicate a parabolic relationship between gov-
ernment size and rate of oil production. In other words, crude oil cannot be pro-
duced to an infinite horizon. In fact, due to economic, geological and technical 
reasons oil production follows governmental orders and decisions. By assuming 
other things constant, the oil production is maximized in our sample when gov-
ernment size is set about 13.57% of GDP4. 
4  This figure is obtained through partial differentiation of Ln(Q) with respect to GS based on 
Table 4, and setting it equal to zero.
Table 4. Dependent variable: LOG(Q), (1985–2015)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 6.294 0.513 12.264 0.000
POLIT 0.043 0.0077 5.598 0.000
GS 0.019 0.0064 3.058 0.003
GS2 –0.0007 0.0001 –7.158 0.000
OPEN 0.0069 0.0008 8.356 0.000
F-statistic = 64.578(0.000) ρ̑ 1= 0.961 ρ̑ 1= 0.000 ρ̑ 1= 0.039
Note: With 31 years and 7 countries, total pool (balanced) observations are 217. ρ̑ i, i = 1,2,3, denotes shares 
of total variance considering cross-section, period, and idiosyncratic error components, respectively.
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In addition, if trade share in GDP (OPEN) increases by one unit, the oil pro-
duction will be increased by 0.0069%. It seems open-door policy induces more 
production of oil and faster depletion of oil reserves. This is due to high depend-
ency to oil and gas revenues. Another explanation of this fact is that the resource 
curse is coming from fossil resources exports. This finding is incompatible with 
the results of Arezki – van der Ploeg (2007). In a study on the role of trade poli-
cies and institutions in natural resource management, they concluded that the 
natural resource curse is severe for economic performance in countries with a 
low degree of trade openness. The key point for the oil-rich countries is the strong 
relationship between oil supply and trade balance. For these countries, the big-
ger openness ratios are correlated with higher extraction of fossil resources. For 
instance, the increasing demand for importing industrial goods motivates oil pro-
duction and exports. 
Inter-fuel substitution and switching from exhaustible to renewable resources 
may help to achieve sustainable growth, so that oil depletion is decreased and 
environmental damages are minimised.
The other policies, which hinder oil depletion effectively, include designing 
energy-saving buildings, using efficient transport fleet, scheduling of commercial 
units properly, and running day light saving (DST) program. After all, making 
macroeconomic and firm-level policies to improve labour and energy productiv-
ity play significant roles in reducing energy intensity in the countries under study. 
For instance, the educational investment and market-based energy pricing cause 
low energy use and oil depletion in the long-term. 
4. CONCLUSIONS
Despite natural resource abundance in Iran, Iraq and GCC countries, the develop-
ment ranks are lower in terms of human development index (HDI)5 than those of 
OECD countries (UNDP 2015). This suggests that oil revenues have not played 
an essential role in their human and economic development. The numerous re-
searches in the world have shown that the benefits of resource wealth have re-
mained little. Based on these studies, the “resource curse hypothesis” has been 
tested for resource-rich countries. These concluded that resource-based econo-
mies face with adverse effects of economic growth such as high unemployment, 
inflation, corruption, and rapid depletion of natural resources. By focusing on 
5  Qatar with HDI= 0.85 ranks 32th, and Iraq with HDI=0.654 ranks 121th among 188 countries in 
2014. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Iran get the 39th, 41th, 
45th, 48th, 52th and 69th ranks, respectively. 
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political systems, the direct relationship between oil depletion and stable and 
strong economy can be found. This linkage in GCC countries is stronger than in 
other developing regions.
In line with previous studies, this paper reaches similar findings. The main 
variable is oil production. According to the econometric results, it is positively 
affected by quality of democracy, measured by polity score. In explaining the 
depletion of oil reserves, I have concentrated on selected macroeconomic deter-
minants of the presented Middle-East countries.
The findings indicate that high quality of democracy can describe the fast de-
pletion of oil reserves in the region. It seems that sample countries are moving 
toward open societies. To do this, they adopt welfare-enhancing policies, which 
require enough and certain oil and gas exports. 
My research showed a positive relationship between oil depletion and trade 
openness. This result may be a consequence of dependency on oil and gas exports 
to fuel economic growth. The higher reliance on oil earnings entails more deple-
tion of oil resources. This finding is applied to other resource-abundant econo-
mies, which have inefficient tax systems and less democratic regimes.
In the case of resource-rich countries, resource misconduct can be a sign of the 
allocation of resource revenues to finance public expenditure. Hence, the positive 
effect of government size on oil depletion is not surprising. 
For policy implications, the plural political system, energy-saving policies, di-
versification in exports, and using sustainable and endogenous sources to finance 
government expenditure are recommended for the other resource-rich countries 
with similar socioeconomic and political regimes.
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